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Abstract. Investigating cognitive processes that underlie privacy-related deci-
sions, prior research has primarily adopted a “privacy calculus” view, indicating 
privacy-related decisions to constitute rational anticipations of risks and bene-
fits connected to data disclosure. Referring to psychological limitations and 
heuristic thinking, however, recent research has discussed notions of bounded 
rationality in this context. Adopting this view, the current research argues that 
privacy decisions are guided by thinking styles, i.e. individual preferences to 
decide in an either rational or intuitive way. Results of a survey indicated that 
individuals high in rational thinking, as reflected by a high need for cognition, 
anticipated and weighed risk and benefits more thoroughly. In contrast, individ-
uals relying on experiential thinking (as reflected by a high faith into intuition) 
overleaped rational considerations and relied on their hunches rather than a pri-
vacy calculus when assessing intentions to disclose information. Theoretical 
and practical implications of these findings are discussed. 
Keywords: Privacy Calculus, Irrational Behavior, Thinking Styles, Faith into 
Intuition, Need for Cognition 
1 Introduction 
Providing the shipping address to an e-commerce website [1], disclosing the own 
position to a location-based mobile service [2], or informing a health monitoring ser-
vice about one’s well-being [3]: When using technology, individuals are steadily con-
fronted with the decision to disclose, or not disclose, private information. Investigat-
ing the cognitive processes that underlie such decisions, researchers have often ap-
plied a “privacy calculus” perspective [2, 4-6], arguing that individuals anticipate and 
trade-off negative and positive outcomes of data disclosure, and decide to disclose 
personal information only if the (perceived) benefits outweigh the (perceived) risks 
[2]. Applying this perspective, prior studies have identified numerous factors enhanc-
ing or mitigating risk and benefit perceptions, including personalization [7, 8], priva-
cy seals [9], or information sensitivity [10, 11]. 
Also, scholars have discussed notions of bounded rationality in this context, argu-
ing individual decision-making to be impacted by psychological limitations, such as 
the attempt for immediate gratification [12], or restricted capabilities to overview and 
process all relevant information [13-15]. Also, the impact of emotions and affective 
thinking was discussed, with several studies yielding evidence on the impact of both 
positive and negative emotions in the context of privacy-related decisions [16-18]. 
Building on these propositions, the current research strives to expand the 
knowledge on rational and irrational processes that underlie privacy-related decisions 
by introducing individual differences in thinking as a precondition to the privacy cal-
culus framework. More precisely, our study focuses on two types of cognitive prefer-
ences, or thinking styles, known to guide individuals’ processing depth and delibera-
tion of rational arguments – need for cognition and faith into intuition [19, 20].  
In the following, we will first review pertinent research streams and introduce our 
conceptual model. Next, we provide an overview over the applied methodology and 
present the results of our empirical study. Then, we will discuss theoretical and prac-
tical implications of the findings, and provide a conclusion. 
2 Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 1 depicts our conceptual model. In line with prior research, we regard privacy 
disclosing behavior, such as disclosing intentions, as a common outcome of individual 
risk and benefit valuations. In contrast to many prior studies, however, we assume (1) 
risk and benefit valuations to constitute interdependent rather than independent fac-
tors, and (2) privacy-valuations to differentially rely on individual thinking styles, in 
particular need for cognition and faith into intuition. Rationales for these assumptions 
are provided in the following. 
2.1 Privacy Calculus 
Prior research on privacy-related decision-making has primarily regarded disclosing 
behaviors, such as intentions to disclose private information to an e-commerce plat-
form [1] or Internet of Things service [3], to result from a conjoint assessment of 
privacy-related risk and benefit perceptions. Denoted as the privacy calculus [1, 5, 6], 
research has found numerous factors enhancing or mitigating risk and benefit percep-
tions, such as the stakeholder requesting information [5], the perceived sensitivity of 
the information to provide [11], or the degree of personalization provided by the data-
requesting product or service [5]. In line with this research, we expect disclosing in-
tentions to succeed perceived risks and perceived benefits of information disclosure, 
and hypothesize: 
H1a: Perceived risks will be negatively associated with intentions to disclose. 
H1b: Perceived benefits will be positively associated with intentions to disclose. 
 
While prior studies have primarily relied on the assumption that risk and benefit 
perceptions constitute independent factors, recent works discussed a potential interde-
pendency of risk and benefit perceptions, with benefit perceptions guiding perceptions 
of risk [13, 18, 21]. This is in line with findings from consumer behavior research, 
arguing risk and benefits to be correlated negatively in individuals’ minds, even if 
they are often correlated positively in reality [22, 23]. Regarding nuclear power, for 
example, individuals tend to associate high risks and thus attribute only few benefits, 
while nuclear power is both highly beneficial and keenly risky in reality. In line with 
these findings, we expect privacy-related risk and benefit perceptions to constitute 
interdependent factors, and hypothesize: 
H2: Perceived benefits will be negatively associated with perceived risks. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual Model. 
2.2 Thinking Styles 
While the privacy calculus literature, at its core, assumes individuals to constitute 
rational decision-makers who carefully anticipate and weigh risk and benefits con-
nected to information disclosure, a small but increasing stream of literature emphasiz-
es the role of bounded rationality, and “gut feelings” in this context [12, 15-18]. In 
this regard, prior studies have associated emotions such as joy and fear with privacy 
risk and protection beliefs [16], or linked affect to website trust and website privacy 
[17]. Moreover, scholars have discussed the role of affective, intuitive thinking as 
opposed to rational cognitions in the context of privacy-related decisions, arguing 
privacy-related decision-making to constitute a partially irrational process [18]. 
In line with these studies, research in cognitive psychology and consumer behavior 
has widely adopted a dual process view on human thinking [19, 20, 24-27]. That is, 
individuals are supposed to possess two independent, yet interacting cognitive sys-
tems that guide decision-making processes: While the experiential system is charac-
terized by quick, automatic responses based on emotional reactions and past experi-
ences, the rational system embraces logical and effortful, yet slow considerations of 
arguments. Consequently, decisions based on the experiential system result in rough 
and heuristic, “intuitive” decisions, while relying on the rational system entails differ-
entiated and deliberate, “cognitive” choices [27, 28]. While complex real-world deci-
sions often require individuals to use both systems in steady interaction [27], differ-
ences in thinking styles determine preferences in approaching these problems on a 
trait level [20]. Stated differently, individuals with a more experiential thinking style 
prefer using the experiential system when taking decisions, while individuals with a 
more rational thinking style mostly rely on the rational system when deciding [20]. In 
past research, an experiential thinking style has often been operationalized as the ten-
dency to have faith into intuition, while the preference for the rational system is char-
acterized by a high need for cognition [20]. Prior work has associated faith into intui-
tion with religious beliefs [29], creative professions [30], and more careful execution 
of habits [31], while need for cognition was found to correlate with security and con-
formity needs [30], analytical professions [30], and more innovative organizational 
behavior [32]. With regard to decision-making, literature reports faith into intuition to 
more thoroughly drive heuristic judgments, while need for cognition was associated 
with deeper and more careful processing of information [33]. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that experiential thinking does not necessarily lead to “worse” decisions. Rather, 
the fit between the decisive situation and the thinking style determines task perfor-
mance. That is, individuals high in experiential thinking perform worse if a task re-
quires strongly rational and analytical thinking. With many daily tasks, however, 
different approaches entail equally valuable solutions, thus not disadvantaging indi-
viduals high in experiential thinking [34]. 
Building on these foundations, we argue individual differences and preferences in 
processing may also shape privacy-related decisions. In particular, we expect individ-
uals with a rational thinking style to more carefully weigh the risks and benefits of a 
data-requesting situation. An experiential thinking style, in contrast, should result in 
more superficial cognitive processing. That is, individuals high in experiential think-
ing should overleap rational considerations and decide based on their intuition. Stated 
differently, we expect privacy calculus variables to fully mediate the relationship 
between need for cognition and disclosing intentions, while, in contrast, a direct effect 
from faith into intuition on intentions to disclose is hypothesized. Given earlier stud-
ies that pointed to the role of heuristic thinking and emotions in the context of infor-
mation privacy [12, 14, 18], it can be assumed that a higher level of faith into intuition 
does not necessarily entail more liberal disclosing decisions. This view is in line with 
research in consumer behavior stating that many tasks are equally solvable by both 
rational and experiential thinking [34]. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H3a: Need for cognition will be positively associated with perceived risks. 
H3b:  Need for cognition will be negatively associated with perceived benefits. 
H3c:  The relationship between need for cognition and intention to disclose will be 
fully mediated by perceived risks and perceived benefits. 
H4:  Faith into intuition will be negatively associated with intention to disclose. 
3 Methods 
In order to test our conceptual model, we conducted an online survey with partici-
pants from the United States recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Monetary incen-
tives were provided for participation. U.S. citizens were chosen in order to prevent 
methodological issues potentially arising from questionnaire translation [35]. Poten-
tial participants were invited to give their opinions on an upcoming application de-
signed to measure individual driving styles and provide customized feedback on safe 
driving. The survey consisted of three parts: 
(1) After clicking on the survey link, participants filled out a short questionnaire 
covering thinking styles. 
(2) Then, the smartphone application was introduced by a screenshot and a short 
description of its purpose. Participants were informed that the application 
was designed in cooperation with an insurance company and told that the 
application collected certain information in order to work properly, including 
year of car construction, the car type, and the distance travelled. The insur-
ance situation was chosen in order to rely on a context known to be particu-
larly sensitive to most consumers [36]. 
(3) In a second short questionnaire, participants were then asked to rate risks and 
benefits connected to data provision to this particular application, and pro-
vide information on their disclosing intentions. Also, relevant control varia-
bles, such as age and gender, were assessed. 
3.1 Measures 
To ensure construct validity, scales from previous studies were used. In order to as-
sess need for cognition and faith into intuition, we used four items per construct from 
the original Rational-Experiential Inventory [20], measuring thinking styles on a sev-
en-point Likert scale ranging from does not apply at all (1) to fully applies (7). Per-
ceived risks as well as perceived benefits were measured by four items each, both 
adopted from Dinev and colleagues [21]. For these constructs, we applied a sev-
en-point Likert scale ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (7). Intentions 
to disclose private information was assessed by three items adopted from Anderson 
and Agarwal [5] and measured on a seven-point semantic differential.  
4 Results 
In total, 177 individuals participated in the study. In a first step, we filtered out partic-
ipants who showed response patterns (e.g. zero variance in scales with reverse-coded 
items) and unreasonable completion times (i.e. < 5 minutes), resulting in an overall 
sample size of 131 individuals. Mean age was 31.47 years (SD = 10.48), with 58% 
male and 42% female subjects. The vast majority of participants stated to own a 
smartphone (93%), and all were residing in the U.S. at the time of the study. MPlus 
6.12 [37] was used for data analysis, and an adjusted maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLMV) was applied to adjust results for non-normality in the data. We used the 
two-step methodology suggested by Segars and Grover [38] and followed established 
guidelines [39, 40] in all steps of analysis. 
4.1 Measurement Model 
We started data analysis by conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in order to 
investigate the psychometric properties of the underlying model. The overall model fit 
of the measurement model was good, indicating our empirical data to largely reflect 
theoretical assumptions on factor structure (Χ2 = 161.15, p = .13, df = 142, Χ2/df = 
1.13, RMSEA = .032, CFI = .98, TLI = .97). We proceeded by inspecting reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity as well as common method variance of 
the measurement model.  
Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Statistics. 
 
 
NC FI RISK BEN INT 
t-value R2 CR AVE 
Item  α = .85 α = .90 α = .93 α = .87 α = .98 
NC1 .74 




    
17.55 .62 
NC3 .82 
    
13.68 .66 
NC4 .72 
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.98 142.90 .96 
Note: NC: Need for Cognition; FI: Faith into Intuition; RISK: Perceived Risks; BEN: Per-
ceived Benefits; INT: Intention to Disclose; CR: Composite Reliability; AVE: Average Vari-
ance Extracted; α: Cronbach’s Alpha. 
Reliability was assessed by analyzing Cronbach’s Alpha and the Composite Reli-
ability of the deployed scales. As shown in Table 1, all scales exceeded the recom-
mended threshold values of .70 for internal consistency, indicating good reliability 
[40]. Convergent validity was examined by (1) analyzing the factor loadings and t-
values of every single indicator used in the CFA and (2) calculating the average vari-
ance extracted (AVE) for every deployed scale. As illustrated in Table 1, (1) factor 
loadings above .70 and highly significant t-values were yielded for every indicator, 
and (2) AVEs exceeded the recommended threshold values of .50 for every deployed 
scale. Since these results indicated high convergent validity of the measurement mod-
el, we proceeded by testing for discriminant validity. For this purpose, we compared 
AVEs to bivariate correlations, assessing whether the square roots of AVEs exceeded  
correlations between the correspondent construct and other constructs in the model 
[41]. As illustrated in Table 2, this was the case for every single construct, implying 
latent constructs to sufficiently differ from each other. Also, we tested for common 
method variance by applying Harman’s Single-Factor Test [42]. As suggested by 
prior literature [43], Harman’s test can be conducted in a CFA framework by model-
ing all manifest indicators to load on a single latent factor, expecting the model to fit 
the data in case common method variance administrates significant influence. Since, 
in our case, the estimation algorithm did not achieve convergence after 1000 itera-
tions, implying a single factor model to not accurately represent the underlying data 
structure, we concluded common method variance to not significantly impact our 
results. In sum, CFA of the measurement model revealed satisfactory psychometric 
properties with regard to reliability, convergent and discriminant validity as well as 
common method variance. Thus, we proceeded by analyzing the structural model. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Bivariate Correlations and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
of Latent Constructs. 
 
M SD  -NC** -FI** RISK BEN INT 
NC 4.92 1.33  -.59** 
   
 
FI 5.00 1.19  -.09** -.69** 
  
 
RISK 4.36 1.49  -.24** -.05** -.78** 
 
 
BEN 4.35 1.25  -.03** -.18** -.47** -.63**  
INT 4.00 1.77  -.13** -.05** -.73** -.54** -.95** 
Note: The diagonal terms indicate the average variance extracted (AVE), non-diagonal terms 
indicate correlations. * p < .05; ** p < .01. NC: Need for Cognition; FI: Faith into Intuition; 
RISK: Perceived Risks; BEN: Perceived Benefits; INT: Intention to Disclose; M: Mean; SD: 
Standard Deviation.  
4.2 Structural Model 
The full structural model, depicted in Figure 2, showed good overall model fit 
(Χ2 = 164.36, p = .13, df = 143, Χ2/df = 1.14, RMSEA = .032, CFI = .98, TLI = .97), 
indicating theoretical assumptions on construct relationships to be largely supported 
by empirical data. Furthermore, a high proportion of explained variance in the main 
outcome variable (R
2
 = .61) implied main predictors of intention to disclose infor-
mation could be covered by the model. 
With regard to H1 and H2, we have hypothesized a situational privacy calculus to 
drive disclosing intentions. In contrast to many prior studies, however, we modeled 
perceived risks and perceived benefits as interdependent, with benefits driving risk 
perceptions. High and significant path coefficients yielded by the structural model 
seem to support these hypotheses. Specifically, the relationship of perceived risks and 
perceived benefits was highly negative (γ = -.46, p < .01), indicating individuals to not 
independently weigh risk and benefits when taking privacy-related decisions. 
With regard to the impact of thinking styles, our results revealed evidence that 
need for cognition was related to perceived risks (H3a), but not to perceived benefits 
in a privacy calculus (H3b). In order to test mediation effects as hypothesized (H3c), 
we conducted mediation tests using the delta method, a more generalized approach 
than the Sobel test [44]. Results revealed a slightly significant indirect effect (δ = -.23, 
p = .05), and an insignificant direct effect (δ = .02, p = .77), resulting in a marginally 
significant total effect (δ = -.20, p < .10). Thus, the results pointed to a full mediation 
of the relationship between need for cognition and intention to disclose by perceived 
risks and perceived benefits. 
 
Fig. 2. Results of structural equation model analysis. 
In Hypothesis 4, we predicted faith into intuition to directly impact disclosing in-
tentions. In order to test this assumption, we employed two approaches: First, we 
analyzed the respective path coefficient as output by the original structural model. As 
depicted in Figure 2, the direct path from faith into intuition to intention to disclose 
was negative and significant, as hypothesized (γ = -.12, p < .05). Second, we tested an 
alternative model that linked faith into intuition to perceived benefits and perceived 
risks, and analyzed the direct as well as indirect relationships between the situational 
calculus variables, faith into intuition, and intention to disclose. Although the overall 
fit of this alternative model did not substantially differ from our original model 
(Χ2 = 161.97, p = .13, df = 143, Χ2/df = 1.13, RMSEA = .032, CFI = .98, TLI = .97), 
direct effects between faith into intuition and perceived risks (γ = .05, p = .53) as well 
as faith into intuition and perceived benefits (γ = .18, p = .08) yielded insignificant 
effects, and mediation analysis revealed only significant direct (δ = -.18, p < .05), but 
insignificant indirect (δ = .10, p = .38) and total effects (δ = -.08, p = .54). Conse-
quently, we concluded that hypothesis 4 was largely supported by the empirical data. 
5 Discussion 
In this study, we designed and conducted a survey aiming to validate the role of think-
ing styles in the context of privacy-related decision-making. More precisely, we hy-
pothesized individuals with highly rational thinking style to carefully weigh risks and 
benefits connected to information disclosure, while individuals high in experiential 
thinking were hypothesized to overleap a privacy calculus and more thoroughly de-
cide based on their hunches. In general, our results supported our hypotheses: Indicat-
ing individuals high in rational thinking to more carefully weigh risks and benefits, 
need for cognition was positively associated with perceived risks, and effects from 
need for cognition on intentions to disclose were carried through privacy calculus 
variables. In contrast, faith into intuition was not associated with privacy calculus 
variables, but exerted direct impact on disclosing intentions. This result implies that 
individuals high in experiential thinking may less carefully weigh risk and benefits 
connected to data disclosure, or even overleap rational considerations. 
5.1 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
In psychology and consumer behavior, thinking styles are defined as consistent 
tendencies of how individuals think, shaping many different situations in a similar 
manner [30]. Given this trait character, it can be expected that an individual’s thinking 
style exerts similar influence in diverse situations, including different situations that 
require data provision. As such, our findings do not only add to the understanding of 
privacy-related decision-making in a concrete situation, but also contribute to litera-
ture that focuses on the relationships between privacy-related constructs and personal-
ity traits, such as the big five [45], social awareness [1], or self-construal [46]. Most 
of these studies have focused on the moderating effect of personality traits in shaping 
privacy-related perceptions. Our work, in contrast, suggests that cognitive processing 
of privacy-related constructs may differ between individuals, and that certain individ-
uals may even completely omit the consideration of some constructs when taking 
privacy decisions. Hence, the findings of our study may lay a fruitful ground for fur-
ther research on individual differences in cognitive processing of privacy-related con-
structs. 
Besides, our findings suggest that the privacy calculus, although offering a useful 
framework for analyzing privacy-related decisions of some individuals, may be less 
suited for others. Specifically, individuals who mostly rely on experiential thinking 
may omit or overleap rational considerations and decide based on their hunches rather 
than anticipating and weighing risks and benefits connected to data disclosure. As 
such, our findings may offer a new perspective on the privacy calculus framework, 
and uniquely add to the increasing literature stream that emphasizes the role of 
bounded rationality, heuristic thinking, or emotional processes in this context (e.g. 
[12-18]). Bounded rationality, in particular, has been discussed as a potential explana-
tion to the repeated observations of inconsistencies between stated privacy concerns 
and disclosing behaviors, denoted as the “privacy paradox” [8, 47-49]. In this regard, 
our study suggests that the severity of the paradox could be moderated by individual 
differences in thinking styles: Individuals who rely on rational thinking should more 
carefully weigh all potential risks of information disclosure, and thus also consider 
their own concerns more intensely. Individuals who rely on experiential thinking, in 
contrast, might be more easily persuaded by characteristics of the data-requesting 
situation (such as emotional appeals [18] or immediate benefits [12]), even if they are 
highly worried on potential data misuse or privacy invasions.  
Against this background, our results furthermore imply that researchers and practi-
tioners should more strongly consider individual differences and personalized solu-
tions when building artifacts and recommender systems that aim to protect personal 
privacy [50, 51]. In particular, actions that target a more intense examination of priva-
cy-related risks and benefits, such as provision of information, recommendations on 
privacy settings, or privacy policies, might be only helpful for individuals high in 
rational thinking. For individuals with a more experiential thinking style, in contrast, 
more subtle, “nudging” [52, 53]  interventions might be more supportive.  
5.2 Limitations and Future Work 
Although, in general, the data supported the conceptual model, there are several limi-
tations in this study that present useful opportunities for future research. 
First, the sample for this research was recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, and 
restricted to U.S. citizens. Despite growing acceptance of survey studies conducted 
via this tool [54], prior research in information privacy has identified cultural differ-
ences in the perception of privacy-related constructs [4, 55]. Therefore, replicating 
and extending the findings of the current study using diverse samples and different 
cultural backgrounds might be helpful to support the generalizability of the results. 
Second, our results revealed a positive relationship of need for cognition with risk 
perceptions. For perceived benefits, however, the correspondent hypothesis was not 
supported by the data. In this regard, the results of this work should be interpreted as a 
preliminary trial to investigate the role of thinking styles in privacy-related decision-
making, and more research is needed to confirm the validity and generalizability of 
our findings. 
Third, we have focused on the most important privacy-related constructs in this 
study in order to emphasize the immediate impact of thinking styles on the privacy 
calculus. However, many studies in the domain of information privacy have focused 
on privacy concerns as a central construct [49], and recently, scholars have argued for 
a distinctive view on privacy-related attitudes and situational privacy calculus varia-
bles [16, 18]. Also, researchers have emphasized the contextual and highly situated 
nature of privacy decisions [49], based on individual differences in product percep-
tions or demographic backgrounds. Hence, extending the proposed research model to 
cover more constructs might help to deepen the understanding on the complex rela-
tionships of thinking styles, privacy-related attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors.  
Fourth, likewise most prior research in the domain of privacy-related decision-
making, our research relied on intentions rather than real disclosing behaviors [49]. 
Moreover, our hypotheses were tested in a scenario-based setup and relied on screen-
shots rather than real product interactions. Given that (1) differences in intentions 
versus behaviors have been highlighted by many scholars (e.g. [49, 56]), extending 
our conceptual model to cover real behaviors in a real environment could substantial-
ly add to the understanding of privacy-related decisions.  
Fifth, our study investigated need for cognition and faith into intuition separately, 
focusing on individuals high on either one or the other dimension. As argued above, 
however, individuals possess both systems, and use them in steady interaction [27]. 
Therefore, a further exploration of thinking styles and dual process models of thinking 
in the context of privacy-related decisions could yield essential insights on when, why 
and how individuals disclose their information when using technology. Considering 
optimal versus non-optimal fit between the decisive situation and the thinking style 
[34], for example, could constitute a fruitful ground for future research. 
6 Conclusion 
In summary, this research provided insights on the role of thinking styles in privacy-
related decision-making. Modeling need for cognition and faith into intuition as pre-
dictors to a privacy calculus, we found individuals high in rational thinking to more 
thoroughly evaluate privacy-related risks and benefits. Individuals high in experiential 
thinking, in contrast, seemed to overleap risk and benefit valuations, basing their deci-
sions on their hunches rather than rational considerations. Opening a new avenue for 
investigation of individual differences as well as notions of bounded rationality in the 
context of information privacy, our study may help to deepen the understanding on 
when, how and why individuals disclose their private information, and how disclosing 
patterns differ between individuals. 
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